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“The American Constitution . . . is founded on a creed. America is the 
only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth 
with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of 
Independence; perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also 
theoretical politics and also great literature.” 
 
— G. K. Chesterton, What I Saw in America (1922) 
About twenty years ago, when I was a young graduate student like many of the 
students in this room, I took a wonderful seminar at the University of Virginia about 
constitutional interpretation taught by Henry Abraham, the first recipient of the 
lifetime achievement award from the Law and Courts section of the American 
Political Science Association.1 In the seminar we read many of the classic works in 
constitutional interpretation, such as John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust, 
Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America, and Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, 
among others.2 I enjoyed the reading, but I quickly came to realize that the theory of 
constitutional interpretation articulated in a particular book or article always seemed 
to lead to the political results favored by the author of the book or article. Bork’s 
                                                           
 * Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. This article was 
prepared for an April 18, 2014, symposium about “History and the Meaning of the 
Constitution” at Cleveland State University Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The 
differences between the written version and the oral version are the addition of footnotes to 
the former and the condensed format of the latter. I thank Stan Gerber and Peter Martin 
Jaworski for reading a draft of the article and Brown University’s Political Theory Project for 
hosting me while I wrote it. 
 1 See Law and Courts Section Award Recipients, http://www.apsanet.org/sections/ 
sectionAwardDetail.cfm?section=Sec02 (last visited June 9, 2014). 
 2 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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theory, for example, determined that Roe v. Wade was incorrect; whereas Dworkin’s 
led to a generous use of racial preferences in higher education admissions decisions. 
Succinctly stated, I concluded that all of the theories of constitutional interpretation 
appealed, at their essential level, to political values. In the apt words of Felix 
Frankfurter, constitutional interpretation “is not at all a science, but applied 
politics.”3 
What I set out to do in my seminar paper for Professor Abraham’s class was 
identify the appropriate political philosophy through which the Constitution should 
be interpreted.4 I quickly expanded my seminar paper into my Ph.D. dissertation, 
which I completed in 1992,5 and my revised Ph.D. dissertation became my first 
book, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional 
Interpretation, which was published in 1995.6 I have spent the last decade or so 
writing about colonial American legal history rather than constitutional 
interpretation,7 but given the topic of today’s symposium—“History and the 
Meaning of the Constitution”—I would now like to discuss the theory of 
constitutional interpretation that I first developed as a graduate student two decades 
ago. It is a theory that also led me to publish the first book about Clarence Thomas’s 
jurisprudence—First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas8—and it is 
a theory about which other scholars have written over the years, including two of the 
other participants at this symposium. I call the theory “liberal originalism.”9 I even 
had the privilege in March of 2013 at Ohio Northern University to debate the theory 
with Pulitzer Prize winning historian Gordon Wood.10 
                                                           
 3 Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938 at 3, 6 (1939). 
 4 The seminar paper became my first publication.  See Scott D. Gerber, Original Intent 
and Its Obligations: Rediscovering the Principles of the American Founding, 11 HAM. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1 (1990). 
 5 See Scott Douglas Gerber, “To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence 
and Constitutional Interpretation” (Ph.D. dissertation, Politics, University of Virginia, 1992). 
 6 See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995). 
 7 See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606-1787 (2011); Scott D. Gerber, Bringing Ideas Back In: A Brief 
Historiography of American Colonial Law, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 359 (2011); Scott D. 
Gerber, Law and the Lively Experiment in Colonial Rhode Island, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 
453 (2013). 
 8 See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS (expanded ed. 2002). 
 9 I coined the phrase two decades before it became associated with the work of Jack 
Balkin. Moreover, my approach to constitutional theory is much different than that of Balkin: 
my liberal originalism is libertarian; Balkin’s theory is egalitarian. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, 
The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2044-45 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(2011)). 
 10 See Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435 (2013) (transcript of the debate).  I also spoke about liberal originalism on 
June 2, 2014, at a conference at Brown University about freedom of expression and the living 
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I. LIBERAL ORIGINALISM 
“Originalism” is a theory of constitutional interpretation that came to prominence 
during the Reagan Administration as an alternative to the so-called notion of a living 
constitution embraced by progressive judges and law professors. Robert Bork wrote 
an influential article about it in the early 1970s,11 but it was Attorney General Edwin 
Meese who brought originalism to public consciousness through a series of speeches 
in the mid-1980s.12 The Federalist Society, which was founded in the 1980s and 
which is co-sponsoring today’s symposium, is likewise strongly committed to 
originalism as the proper method for interpreting the Constitution.13 
Shortly thereafter, the law reviews exploded with an avalanche of articles both 
criticizing and defending originalism, and the commentary on the subject has 
continued unabated ever since.14 Books and articles about the history of originalism 
have been published,15 and the debate over originalism has now shifted from what 
Meese famously called “a jurisprudence of original intention”16 to a self-styled “new 
originalism” that searches—sometimes via highly technical discussions of the 
philosophy of language17—for the original public meaning of the Constitution’s 
text.18 
In my work I have labeled the dominant iterations of originalism “conservative 
originalism.” It is an approach that dictates that judges may legitimately recognize 
only those rights specifically mentioned in the Constitution, or ascertainably implicit 
in its structure or history. In all other cases, conservative originalists argue, the 
majority is entitled to govern—to make moral choices—through the political 
                                                           
constitution hosted jointly by Brown and Northwestern University School of Law.  See 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Theory_Project/event/freedom-expression-living-
constitution-conference (last visited June 11, 2014). 
 
 11 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L. J. 1 (1971). 
 12 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Address before the American Bar Association, in THE GREAT 
DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1 (1986). 
 13 See, e.g., ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 
2007). 
 14 See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013); Peter Martin 
Jaworski, Originalism All the Way Down: Or, the Explosion of Progressivism, 27 CAN. J. L. & 
JURISP. 313 (2013). 
 15 See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). 
 16 Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5 (1988), reprinted in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND 
BEHAVIOR 584 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat ed., 2d. ed., 1989). 
 17 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, “Semantic Originalism,” Illinois Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-24, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (last visited June 11, 2014). 
 18 See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 14, at ch. 2 (providing a concise history of the meaning of 
originalism). 
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process.19 “Liberal originalism,” by contrast, maintains that the Constitution should 
be interpreted in light of the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence. 
Liberal originalism rejects both conservative originalism and the notion of a living 
constitution on the ground that they are merely post-hoc rationalizations for pre-
conceived political results. The conservatives’ initial call for a jurisprudence of 
original intention was a response to the liberal jurisprudence of the Warren and early 
Burger Courts, whereas the progressives’ notion of a living constitution was a 
reaction to conservative originalism. The “new” conservative originalists endeavor 
to guide the decisions of the conservative Rehnquist and Roberts Courts,20 while 
many on the Left—“judicial minimalists” and “popular constitutionalists”—are 
presently trying to limit or eliminate judicial review itself so that the now-
conservative federal judiciary cannot rollback existing precedents involving hot 
button social issues such as affirmative action and abortion. These newer theories, 
like the older ones, are too often merely partisan arguments masquerading as 
constitutional theory.21 
Liberal originalism insists that conservative originalists mischaracterize the 
Constitution as establishing a majority-rule democracy, a mischaracterization that is 
also made by many constitutional theorists of progressive political views. Because of 
the Framers’ desire to avoid what Elbridge Gerry called the “excess of democracy,”22 
they created a republican form of government, not a majority-rule democracy. And 
in that republican form of government, the Court is to play a central role: chief 
guardian of the natural rights of the American people, especially of individuals and 
minorities. Briefly put, I employ a conservative methodology, but arrive at liberal 
results, as “liberal” is understood in the classic sense of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Lockean political philosophy. 
Part I of To Secure These Rights documents how the United States of America 
was founded to secure the natural rights of the American people.23 “To secure these 
rights,” Thomas Jefferson proclaims in the Declaration of Independence, is the 
                                                           
 19 With the notable exception of Randy Barnett, the vast majority of “new originalists” 
share the Bork/Meese preference for deferring as much as possible to the political process. 
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: 
A Reply to Professor Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005). See generally Randy E. 
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 
(2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 20 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 
(2004). 
 21 See, e.g., Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1067 (2008). See also Scott D. Gerber, Book Review, 92 J. AM. HIST. 1532 
(2006) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Scott D. Gerber, The Judicial Brezhnev 
Doctrine, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 309 (2000) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE 
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) and MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)). 
 22 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 48 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(remarks of Elbridge Gerry). See generally GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY: 
FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN (1976). 
 23 See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. I. 
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reason that “governments are instituted among men.”24 To secure natural rights is, 
therefore, why the Constitution was enacted, and to secure natural rights is how the 
Constitution should be interpreted. That is the “original intent” of the Founders.   
Here, it is necessary to explain the connection between the Founders’ 
background attitudes on the purpose of government and the interpretation of the 
particular provisions of the Constitution. The most important point to recognize is 
that, as just mentioned, the Constitution was written for a reason: to establish a form 
of government that would provide better security for natural rights than was 
provided under the Articles of Confederation. To make the point somewhat 
differently, the particular provisions of the Constitution were written with the 
Founders’ background attitudes in mind. The Constitution is not an end in itself; it is 
the means by which the American political community’s ideals—its ends—are 
ordered. It is therefore necessary to interpret the Constitution in light of those ideals; 
ideals expressed with unparalleled eloquence by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration 
of Independence. 
The necessity of keeping the Founders’ background attitudes in mind when 
interpreting the particular provisions of the Constitution becomes even more 
apparent when one realizes that many of the most significant provisions of the 
Constitution are phrased in general terms, especially those concerning individual 
rights. For example, the First Amendment’s directive that Congress shall make no 
law “abridging the freedom of speech” is not unambiguous, nor is the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” Moving beyond 
the original ten amendments, what does it mean to say, as the Fourteenth 
Amendment does, that no state shall deny to any person “the equal protection of the 
laws”? Provisions as general as these—and there are many others in the 
Constitution—are not self-interpreting. They can be given meaning and life only 
when they are construed in light of the moral and political principles upon which 
they are based. As political scientist David O’Brien aptly observed long ago, 
“Interpreting the Constitution … presupposes a judicial and political philosophy and 
poses inescapable questions of substantive value choices.”25 Although I reject the 
argument advanced by many proponents of the application of literary analysis to 
legal texts—that meaning cannot be extracted from legal texts but can only be put 
into them; that, in other words, the Constitution means nothing and means 
anything—it is difficult to deny the more modest claim that “texts can be interpreted 
only in some ‘context.’”26 And that “context,” as To Secure These Rights describes, 
is the Lockean political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence. 
Of course, it is possible to construe the provisions of the Constitution in light of 
philosophical principles other than those embodied in the Declaration. One need 
only peruse the plethora of provocative theories of constitutional interpretation 
advanced over the years to appreciate this fact. However, those advancing non-
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation have failed to show that the 
particular approach they favor is based on anything other than their own moral and 
political preferences. Indeed, the late Ronald Dworkin, a forceful critic of 
                                                           
 24 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 25 1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 89 (1991). 
 26 Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, Preface to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: 
A HERMENEUTIC READER  xi, xii (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). 
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originalism, maintained that we should abandon the search—hopeless, in his view—
for the Framers’ intent in favor of the “best argument” about political morality.27 
The problem with Dworkin’s interpretive position, and a problem repeated by 
most lawyers attempting to articulate theories of constitutional interpretation—
including, with all due respect, Jack Balkin, who now claims to be an originalist28—
is that under his theory substantive values are inevitably established by those with 
the best argumentation skills—by clever lawyers such as Dworkin himself. If the 
rule of law means anything, it surely means that the Constitution should not be 
interpreted in such a subjective fashion, especially by unelected and life-tenured 
judges. Moreover, if the American people do wish to depart from the natural rights 
principles of the Declaration of Independence and adopt, for instance, the 
progressive agenda preferred by most American law professors or the 
majoritarianism of the vast majority of conservative originalists, they should employ 
the Article V amendment process and so specify. To date, this has not occurred—and 
it is not likely to occur. 
II. THE REACTION TO LIBERAL ORIGINALISM 
Space constraints permit me to discuss only a couple of the reactions to liberal 
originalism. A number of scholars have praised it,29 and at least one has embraced it 
as his own.30 I will not discuss that reaction here, other than to say that it was nice to 
                                                           
 27 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 145 (1993). 
 28 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 29 To Secure These Rights was reviewed in a lot of different outlets, including the 
American Historical Review, American Journal of Legal History, American Political Science 
Review, Choice, Constitutional Commentary, FreedomAndCapitalism.com, Harvard Law 
Review, Journal of Law and Politics, Journal of the Early Republic, Journal of Politics, 
Laissez Faire, Law and History Review, Law and Politics Book Review, Legal Studies Forum, 
Political Science Quarterly, Second Renaissance Books, and Yale Law Journal. 
 30 See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 489 (2004) (reviewing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND 
IMPACT (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002)). Sandefur’s citations to authority are sometimes 
misleading as to who coined the phrase “liberal originalism” (I did). I brought my concern to 
his attention, he sort of apologized for it, and he has since apparently stopped citing my work 
altogether when discussing the Declaration of Independence in constitutional interpretation. 
See Emails from Scott Gerber to Timothy M. Sandefur, May 8 and May 10, 2010, and Email 
from Timothy M. Sandefur to Scott Gerber, May 9, 2010 (on file with Gerber). See generally 
TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014) (failing to cite either To Secure These 
Rights or First Principles). Sandefur had invited me in 2007 to present a talk about “The 
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation” to the Sacramento, California 
lawyers’ chapter of the Federalist Society. Fortunately for me, at least some other scholars 
realize that Sandefur’s work borrows heavily from mine. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter 
J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 260 n.104 (2009) (pointing out that 
Sandefur’s theory of constitutional interpretation “that relies on the Declaration of 
Independence as part of the nation’s organic law” is “based in substantial part on the work of 
Scott Gerber”). It is, of course, problematic when others do not realize it. See, e.g., Ethan J. 
Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 354 n.5 
(2007) (“Although I can’t spell out the differences in this context, what I’m calling ‘lefty’ 
originalism is rather different from what Timothy Sandefur has recently called ‘liberal 
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read. Instead, I will concentrate on the criticisms of two of the other participants at 
this symposium, Patrick Charles and Lee Strang. I then will discuss Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s use of liberal originalism and the reactions to his use of it. 
A. Patrick Charles on Liberal Originalism 
Historian Patrick Charles discussed my work on liberal originalism in a 2011 
article in the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal entitled “Restoring ‘Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness’ in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An 
Exercise in Legal History.”31 He disagrees with my work. For example, he writes: 
As a matter of eighteenth-century constitutional thought, Gerber’s claims 
falter, like [Randy] Barnett’s, in that they misconstrue the concepts of the 
public or common good and the true importance of virtue in republican 
constitutionalism. Perhaps Gerber’s greatest shortfall is his mis-
characterization of the “first principle” of government. Gerber reads it as 
embodying “the institutional means to secure the natural-rights 
philosophical ends [in] the Declaration.” However, as will be shown 
below, this ignores that the first principle of government is the consent of 
the governed, or what the founding generation referred to as the good of 
the whole.32 
The above quotation makes clear that Charles disagrees with liberal originalism 
because he is a utilitarian, not a libertarian. As he concisely put it in a ConSource 
Blog post summarizing his 2011 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal article, 
“American independence and the Declaration [of Independence] rested on one 
simple governmental principle—the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
through an equal government.”33 Unfortunately for Charles, as I describe at length in 
To Secure These Rights, the political theorist who most influenced America’s 
founders was John Locke,34 the father of libertarian political philosophy, not Jeremy 
Bentham, the leading utilitarian of his day.35 In short, Charles fails to understand why 
the United States of America is a nation: its origins, purposes, and ideals. To invoke 
the “celebrated” Montesquieu,36 America’s “animating principle”37 is liberty, not 
                                                           
originalism.’ See Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for Our Future, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2004).”). 
 31 See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457 
(2011). 
 32 Id. at 480. 
 33 Patrick J. Charles, Placing the Declaration of Independence in Historical Context: Thoughts 
on Educating Current and Future Generations about America’s Founding Document, 
http://blog.consource.org/post/27415739804/placing-the-declaration-of-independence-in-historical 
(last visited June 13, 2014). 
 34 See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. I. 
 35 Bentham famously referred to the American idea that there were natural rights as 
“nonsense upon stilts.” Human Rights, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/275840/ 
human-rights/219322/Nonsense-upon-stilts-the-critics-of-natural-rights (quoting Bentham). 
 36 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
8 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
utility. After all, utilitarians are willing to sacrifice private rights for the greater 
public good. The Founders of the United States decreed precisely the opposite. 
B. Lee Strang on Liberal Originalism 
Lee Strang has discussed my work in a number of places. I will focus on his 
article “Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Constitutional Right to Life,”38 an article that borrows from a much longer article 
about the Declaration of Independence that he published previously.39 Strang kindly 
refers to me as “the best exponent of the Declarationist view.”40 He also kindly states 
that “[l]ikely the strongest scholarly work on the interpretive impact of the 
Declaration on constitutional interpretation was written by Professor Scott Gerber, 
To Secure These Rights”41 and that “Professor Gerber has put forth what is likely the 
strongest scholarly argument that the original meaning of the Constitution (or at least 
some of its provisions) incorporated the Declaration.”42 
Of course, Strang says all of these wonderful things only to conclude that I am 
wrong. He writes: 
Gerber fails to tie the general belief in natural rights during the founding 
and ratification period to the Constitution except in the most general way 
and therefore fails to support his specific contention that the Declaration 
should play an explicit, privileged role in constitutional interpretation. 
Further, even if one accepted Gerber’s argument that the Constitution was 
originally understood as the means to effectuate protection of the rights 
listed in the rights phrase, it does not necessarily follow—and Gerber fails 
to show that it did follow historically—that the meaning of the text of the 
Constitution is something other than its original meaning, a meaning 
somehow closer to the Declaration.43 
With all due respect to the talented Professor Strang, he does not understand how 
I view the Declaration’s interpretive function. In a new book entitled Universal 
Rights and the Constitution, Stephen Simon does understand it. Here is what Simon 
says:  
                                                           
 37 M. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748) 21, 30 (Anne M. Cohler et al. ed. 
& trans., 1989). 
 38 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: 
A Constitutional Right to Life, in LIFE & LEARNING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH 
UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE AT VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, 2006 at 43 (Joseph 
W. Koterski ed., 2007), available at http://www.uffl.org/vol16/strang06.pdf. 
 39 See generally Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the 
Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 413 
(2006). 
 40 Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Constitutional Right to Life, supra note 38, at 47. 
 41 Id. at 48. 
 42 Id. at 54. 
 43 Id. at 54-55. 
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[Gerber] stresses that the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions only 
can be understood properly when recognized as driven by the “natural-
rights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence” and the 
American Revolution.  Gerber looks to the meaning that the words had for 
those who gave them legal force while emphasizing that this meaning 
must be understood within its intellectual context. Although Gerber would 
construe the principles embedded in the Constitution at a higher level of 
generality than would many exclusivists, he nevertheless views 
constitutional understandings as fixed to the document’s original 
meaning. The appropriate vehicle of constitutional change is Article V, 
and the original meaning cannot be “trumped by evolving precedent, 
values, or needs.” When Gerber speaks of natural rights, he is referring to 
the beliefs of those who produced the Constitution, beliefs with specific, 
substantive content. His method of interpretation does not invite judges to 
rely on any universal arguments they might happen to consider sound. 
The Framers’ natural law approach allows judges to rely only on natural 
law ideas with the appropriate historical pedigree. An approach like 
Gerber’s is understood best as an exclusivist position instilled with proper 
appreciation for the character of the beliefs that informed the 
Constitution’s enactment.44 
In short, Professor Simon, who is himself a political theorist, understands that my 
approach to constitutional interpretation is grounded in political theory, rather than 
history. Admittedly, mine is a theory that identifies the relevant political theory by 
appealing to history, but I do not use history in the same narrow sense that a 
conservative originalist such as Professor Strang would prefer. As I mentioned 
during a public debate with historian Gordon Wood about “The Supreme Court and 
the Uses of History”: “My answer to the question whether Supreme Court justices 
should use history to decide cases is a qualified yes. This is what I mean by that: 
they should use history to identify the political philosophy of the American 
Founding and then decide cases in light of that political philosophy.”45 
Strang’s discussion of slavery likewise reveals that, as a conservative originalist, 
he does not understand liberal originalism. He writes: 
The Constitution’s accommodation of slavery and the denial of equality 
that it entailed makes it very difficult—if not impossible—to coherently 
interpret the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration. Even were 
one to assume that one could interpret the Constitution in light of the 
Declaration, one would still have to explain how the practice of slavery 
with its gross denial of equality existed—indeed, flourished—under the 
Constitution, a practice that was not ended except through the Civil War.46 
Abraham Lincoln, the person most responsible for ending slavery, by contrast, 
understood liberal originalism. Indeed, as I describe in To Secure These Rights, like 
                                                           
 44 STEPHEN A. SIMON, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 87-88 (2014). 
 45 Wood & Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, supra note 10, at 437 
(remarks of Gerber). 
 46 Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Constitutional Right to Life, supra note 38, at 56. 
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Thomas Jefferson before him, and Martin Luther King Jr. and Clarence Thomas after 
him, Lincoln embraced liberal originalism.47 Lincoln proclaimed as follows in his 
famous speech criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the infamous case 
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): 
Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, admits that the 
language of the Declaration is broad enough to include the whole of the 
human family, but he and Judge Douglas argue that the authors of that 
instrument did not intend to include negroes, by the fact that they did not 
at once, actually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this 
grave argument comes to just nothing at all, by the other fact, that they 
did not at once, or ever afterwards, actually place all white people on an 
equality with one another . . . . They did not mean to assert the obvious 
untruth, that all men were then actually enjoying equality, nor yet, that 
they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no 
power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so 
that the enforcement of it might follow as circumstances should 
permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which 
could be familiar to all, and revered by all, constantly looked to, 
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, 
constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening 
its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people 
of all colors everywhere.48 
As Lincoln’s remarks intimate, omitting Jefferson’s objection to slavery in the 
Declaration of Independence—Jefferson wanted to condemn it49—and including 
guarantees to slavery in the original Constitution were unfortunate political 
compromises that had to be made if the United States of America was to come into 
being in 1776 and create a strong central government in 1787—both of which were 
necessary if slavery was one day to be abolished. The necessity of political 
compromise aside, the inhumane treatment of slaves and the long and bloody Civil 
War that resulted from slavery are indelible proof of the pain that departing from the 
Declaration’s natural-rights principles has engendered in the United States. 
Revealingly, what unites Strang and Charles in their opposition to liberal 
originalism is a shared distrust of a vigorous role for the judiciary in American 
constitutionalism. Charles is a traditional majoritarian, albeit a thoughtful one, who 
wishes to defer as much as possible to the electoral process, even at the expense of 
private rights. Strang is one of the most prolific of the “new” originalists and he 
wants judges to enforce the determinate original meaning of the Constitution’s text. 
In what he terms the “construction zone”—in other words, when the original public 
                                                           
 47 See also Scott D. Gerber, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson, LEGAL TIMES, May 5, 
2003, at 60-61. 
 48 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision, June 26, 1857, reprinted in 1 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 398 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (emphasis 
supplied in bold face). 
 49 See, e.g., Gerard W. Gawalt, Drafting the Declaration, in THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT ch. 1 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002). 
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meaning is under-determined—he insists that judges should defer to contrary 
constructions by elected officials. 
As I explain in Part II of To Secure These Rights,50 and as I detail at great length 
in my recent Oxford University Press book about the origins of judicial 
independence in America,51 the judiciary needs to play a vigorous role in American 
life in order to check and balance the elected legislature and executive so as to 
ensure the people’s personal freedoms. Summarily stated, neither Charles nor Strang 
appreciates that in the political theory of American constitutional government there 
is what John Adams referred to as “a distinct judicial power” whose principal charge 
is to protect individual rights from overreaching by the elected branches of the 
government.52 In fact, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 written by Adams, and 
which served as one of the prototypes of the U.S. Constitution, listed a strong and 
independent judiciary as a fundamental right of the people: 
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, 
liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of 
the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be 
tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity 
will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the security of 
the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the 
supreme judicial court should hold their offices as long as they behave 
themselves well, and that they should have honorable salaries ascertained 
and established by standing laws.53 
III. JUSTICE THOMAS’S LIBERAL ORIGINALISM 
I was writing my Ph.D. dissertation about the relationship between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States when 
Clarence Thomas was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court. The media was 
reporting at the time that Thomas was likewise interested in that relationship. I do 
not recall whether it was my idea or somebody else’s, but given who Thomas was—
a judge on the second most significant court in the United States—and who he was 
likely to become—a justice on the most powerful court in the world—I put aside my 
dissertation for a couple of weeks and wrote an article to assess the degree to which 
the views on constitutional interpretation espoused in Thomas’s speeches and 
writings, and in his decisions on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
manifested the Lockean liberal commitment to individual rights that I believed the 
Declaration demanded.54 About five years later, after To Secure These Rights had 
                                                           
 50 See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6, at pt. II. 
 51 See GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 7. 
 52 See GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 7. See also Scott D. Gerber, The 
Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223 (2007), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/gerber.html (last visited June 14, 2014). 
 53 MASS. CONST. art. XXIX (1780). 
 54 See Scott D. Gerber, Introductory Address: Justice for Clarence Thomas: An 
Intellectual History of Justice Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Supreme Court, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 667, 667-68 (2011). See generally Scott D. Gerber, The Jurisprudence of 
Clarence Thomas, 8 J. L. & POL. 107 (1991). 
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been published and reviewed, my editor encouraged me to write what became the 
first book-length exegesis on Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, First Principles: The 
Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas.55   
One of my conclusions in First Principles was that Justice Thomas is a liberal 
originalist in civil rights cases and a conservative originalist in other areas of 
constitutional law.56 As I have pointed out elsewhere, Thomas’s liberal originalism 
traces to Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr., and it is 
an originalism that places the Declaration of Independence at the heart of the 
American conception of civil rights.57 
When Jefferson wrote the Declaration during the summer of 1776, he was 
inspired by the prevailing individual rights political theory of the day (most notably, 
the political theory of seventeenth-century British theorist John Locke). When 
Lincoln condemned slavery in the 1850s and 1860s, he was doing so on individual 
rights grounds (slaves were people, Lincoln insisted, who were entitled to enjoy the 
rights of individuals—especially the right to be free). And when King delivered his 
famous “I Have a Dream” speech in 1963, his “dream” was that his children would 
one day live in a nation “where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but 
by the content of their character.”58 Clarence Thomas shares this vision of the 
American regime. He has for most of his public life. 
For example, Thomas wrote in a 1987 article in the Howard Law Journal that the 
“founding principles of equality and liberty” set forth in the Declaration of 
Independence “dictate the policy of action towards Black Americans.”59 Thomas, 
then-chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 
credited the first Justice John Marshall Harlan with being the initial member of the 
Supreme Court to appreciate the connection between the Declaration and the 
enforcement of the nation’s civil rights laws. In particular, Thomas applauded 
Harlan’s solitary dissent in the infamous 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the case in 
which the Court constitutionalized the practice of racial segregation. It was in that 
stinging dissent that Harlan coined the phrase that would later become so closely 
associated with Thomas himself: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”60 
Similarly, in a 1985 article in the Stetson Law Review, Thomas discussed his 
daily responsibilities of enforcing the nation’s civil rights laws as chairman of the 
EEOC. His rejection of the agency’s group-based emphasis was clear. He wrote: 
I intend to take EEO enforcement back to where it started by defending 
the rights of individuals who are hurt by discriminatory practices. To do 
                                                           
 55 See GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See, e.g., Gerber, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson, supra note 47. The analysis that 
follows in this section borrows from several of my earlier works. See, e.g., id. 
 58 Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial in 
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in Gerber, ed., THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, at 317, 319. 
 59 Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of 
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 984 (1987). 
 60 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/5
2014] LIBERAL ORIGINALISM  13 
this, we intend to pursue individual cases as well as pattern and practice 
cases . . . . Those who insist on arguing that the principle of equal 
opportunity, the cornerstone of civil rights, means preferences for certain 
groups have relinquished their roles as moral and ethical leaders in this 
area. I bristle at the thought, for example, that it is morally proper to 
protest against minority racial preferences in South Africa while arguing 
for such preferences here.61 
Thomas’s critics strived during his 1991 Supreme Court confirmation process to 
mischaracterize his views about the Declaration of Independence. For example, 
Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe wrote in a scathing New York Times 
op-ed that Thomas would use the Declaration to turn back the clock to the darkest 
days of the nation’s history: 
Most conservatives criticize the judiciary for expanding its powers, 
“creating” rights rather than “interpreting” the Constitution . . . . Clarence 
Thomas, judging from his speeches and scholarly writings, seems instead 
to believe judges should enforce the Founders’ natural law philosophy—
the inalienable rights “given man by his Creator”—which he maintains is 
revealed most completely in the Declaration of Independence. He is the 
first Supreme Court nominee in 50 years to maintain that natural law 
should be readily consulted in constitutional interpretation.62 
What critics such as Tribe failed to mention was that Thomas was articulating the 
standard individual rights interpretation of the Declaration: the same interpretation 
shared by Jefferson, Lincoln, and King. Indeed, Thomas made this point repeatedly 
during his confirmation battle. For instance, when asked by then-Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, arguably his most unwavering opponent on the Judiciary 
Committee, about a speech he had previously given, Thomas responded: 
[T]he point I think throughout these speeches is a notion that we should 
be careful about the relationship between the government and the 
individual and should be careful that the government itself does not at 
some point displace or infringe on the rights of the individual. That is a 
concern, as I have noted here, that runs throughout my speeches.63 
Justice Thomas has continued to speak publicly about the Declaration of 
Independence since being confirmed to the Supreme Court. He reminded the faculty 
and students of James Madison University that Madison, the chief architect of the 
Constitution, built the Constitution on “universal principles, [which] we find . . . 
most succinctly and, indeed, elegantly stated by Madison’s close friend, Thomas 
                                                           
 61 Clarence Thomas, The Equal Opportunity Commission: Reflections on a New 
Philosophy, 15 STETSON L. REV. 29, 35 (1985). Of course, apartheid is no longer the law in 
South Africa. 
 62 Laurence H. Tribe, “Natural Law” and the Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at 
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 63 The Thomas Hearings, 102d Cong. (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas, then-United 
States Supreme Court Justice nominee, to the Senate Judiciary Committee), available at 
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Jefferson, in our Declaration of Independence.”64 Thomas went on in his speech to 
describe how the Constitution secures the rights promised to all Americans by the 
Declaration. Thomas’s critics would be well served by reading this speech. 
His critics also should read his February 9, 1999, Lincoln Day address to the 
Claremont Institute. There, Justice Thomas urges the American people “to be ever 
vigilant in reminding us—me and everyone else who has the privilege of serving our 
nation through public office—of the principles of our founding and how they apply 
to the controversies of our time.”65 That speech, in my judgment, is the most 
significant speech about the Declaration of Independence since Reverend King’s “I 
Have a Dream.” 
Thomas is, of course, not alone in his commitment to the Declaration of 
Independence. However, what makes Thomas the most important voice today on the 
Declaration is the official position he occupies in the American regime: one of nine 
members of the nation’s highest court. Thomas, in short, has the power to do 
something about effectuating the individual rights principles of the Declaration. His 
civil rights opinions and votes demonstrate that he has been more than willing to act 
on them during his tenure on the Court. 
In 1995's Missouri v. Jenkins, for example, Thomas became the first Supreme 
Court justice to directly criticize Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Although he 
called state-mandated segregation “despicable,” he said that the Court was wrong in 
1954 to rely on disputable social evidence to declare segregation unconstitutional 
rather than invoking the “constitutional principle” that “the government must treat 
citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic or religious groups.”66 
Justice Thomas’s conception of civil rights as an individual, not a group, concern 
also explains his approach to voting rights. In 1994, in Holder v. Hall, Thomas wrote 
in a concurring opinion that racial groups should not “be conceived of largely as 
political interest groups,” that blacks do not all think alike, and that existing case law 
should be overturned to eliminate claims for “proportional allocation of political 
power according to race.”67 Thomas echoed these views in several more recent 
Voting Rights Act cases, including Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
Number One v. Holder (2009) and Shelby County v. Holder (2013).68 He again wrote 
separately in those cases.69 
With respect to racial preferences, Justice Thomas has issued four separate 
opinions on the subject. In Adarand Constructors v. Peña, the 1995 government 
                                                           
 64 Clarence Thomas, James Madison Day Lecture, Remarks Delivered at James Madison 
University (March 15, 2001), available at http://www.jmu.edu/jmuweb/general/news2/general_ 
200132382450.shtml. 
 65 Clarence Thomas, The Virtue of Practical Wisdom, Remarks Delivered at the Third 
Annual Claremont Institute Lincoln Day Colloquium (Feb. 9, 1999), reprinted in Gerber, ed., 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 49, at 243, 247. 
 66 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905, 912 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 68 See Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 69 See Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
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contracting case that seemingly called the constitutionality of racial preferences into 
serious question, Thomas invoked the Declaration of Independence as the rule of 
decision.70 He wrote: 
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart 
of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inherent 
equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of 
Independence (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”).71 
Justice Thomas again invoked the Declaration in his thirty-one-page separate 
opinion in the 2003 University of Michigan affirmative action case, Grutter v. 
Bollinger. After criticizing the Grutter majority for “fail[ing] to justify its decision 
by reference to any principle,”72 Thomas closed his opinion by reminding his 
colleagues that the controlling principle—that articulated in the Declaration—
required the case to come out the other way. He wrote: 
[T]he majority has placed its imprimatur on a practice that can only 
weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence and the Equal Protection Clause . . . . It has been nearly 140 
years since Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual ancestors of the Law 
School to “[d]o nothing with us!” and the Nation adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Now we must wait another 25 years to see this principle of 
equality vindicated. I therefore respectfully dissent.73 
In 2007's Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1, Justice Thomas continued with this theme: 
The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a colorblind 
Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plurality . . . . 
But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the 
Constitution is Justice Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”74 
                                                           
 70 It is possible to find racial preferences unconstitutional without invoking the Declaration of 
Independence. For example, some conservative civil rights lawyers and scholars focus on the text 
and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Originalism and Affirmative 
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and concurring in the judgment). 
 72 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
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 73 Id. at 378. 
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(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Most recently, in a twenty-page concurring opinion in the 2013 case of Fisher v. 
University of Texas,75 Justice Thomas equated the racial classifications embraced by 
the University of Texas with two of the Supreme Court’s most reviled decisions, 
Korematsu v. United States (1944),76 in which the Court permitted the internment of 
people with Japanese ancestry during World War II, and Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896),77 wherein the Court endorsed the “separate-but-equal” doctrine eventually 
rejected unanimously in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).78 Thomas’s liberal 
originalist approach to civil rights law was in full sail when the Court’s lone African 
American justice reminded the state of Texas’s flagship institution of higher 
education that the “Equal Protection Clause guarantees every person the right to be 
treated equally by the State, without regard to race. At the heart of this [guarantee] 
lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals and not as 
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.”79 And it is because the Equal 
Protection Clause guarantees every American’s constitutional right to be treated as 
an individual that, Justice Thomas insisted, the nation’s highest Court “must subject 
all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, all racial 
classifications are categorically prohibited unless they are ‘necessary to further a 
compelling government interest.’”80 Unfortunately for the University of Texas, 
Thomas continued,  
the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity—assuming 
they exist—hardly qualify as a compelling state interest. Indeed, the 
argument that educational benefits justify racial discrimination was 
advanced in support of racial segregation in the 1950's, but emphatically 
rejected by this Court. And just as the alleged educational benefits of 
segregation were insufficient to justify racial discrimination then, see 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the alleged 
educational benefits of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination 
today.81 
IV. THE REACTION TO JUSTICE THOMAS’S LIBERAL ORIGINALISM 
The Left criticizes Justice Thomas heavily for his civil rights opinions and votes. 
For example, Eric Segall, a progressive constitutional law professor at Georgia State 
University College of Law, accused Thomas of “hypocrisy” and “bad faith” in a 
blistering article about Thomas’s affirmative action jurisprudence published shortly 
                                                           
 75 See Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). For more on Thomas’s opinion in Fisher, see Scott D. Gerber, Clarence Thomas, 
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 79 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 80 Id. at 2423 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Fisher v. University of Texas.82 To 
his credit, Segall subsequently invited me to give a talk about Thomas at Georgia 
State so that his colleagues could hear the other side of the story: a rare display of 
commitment to intellectual diversity in a law professorate that is too often hell-bent 
on suppressing conservative and libertarian perspectives.83 The gist of Segall’s 
article is that, as an originalist, Thomas must support affirmative action rather than 
insist it is unconstitutional. Segall concludes his article as follows: 
The constitutional question raised by Fisher, and by all affirmative action 
cases, is whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prevents governmental officials from using racial 
classifications to increase diversity, redress prior discrimination, and 
foster a more racially tolerant society. A Justice sincerely concerned with 
the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment would have to concede 
that there is little constitutional basis for foreclosing majority groups from 
assisting minority groups in this manner. Justice Thomas claims to be a 
Justice concerned only with text and history (not the Justices’ personal 
views on difficult policy questions), yet also suggests the Constitution 
absolutely prohibits all racial preferences. In light of the constitutional 
text, and its history, he simply cannot have it both ways.84 
As I mentioned during my talk at Georgia State, my friend Professor Segall does 
not understand Justice Thomas’s originalism. He is far from alone in this regard. 
Segall was writing in anticipation of Fisher in the hopes, it seems, of somehow 
“shaming” Thomas into ruling for the University of Texas. Scott Lemieux was 
writing after Fisher had been decided: a decision in which, as I discussed above, 
Thomas not only ruled against the University of Texas but also reiterated his 
longstanding belief that the Equal Protection Clause outlaws racial preferences in 
higher education admissions decisions. Lemieux opined in the liberal American 
Prospect magazine that “The original understanding of the 14th Amendment can be 
interpreted as forbidding all state affirmative action only if the principles of equal 
protection are defined at such a high level of abstraction that there’s no meaningful 
distinction between ‘originalism’ and any other form of constitutional 
interpretation.”85 Of course, Lemieux fails to appreciate that (1) liberal originalism is 
a form of originalism that differs markedly from both conservative originalism and 
                                                           
 82 See Eric J. Segall, Justice Thomas and Affirmative Action: Bad Faith, Confusion or Both?, 3 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 111 (2013), available at http://wakeforestlawreview.com/justice-
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the notion of a living constitution86 and (2) Justice Thomas is a liberal originalist in 
civil rights cases.87 
Even some staunch supporters of Justice Thomas’s decisions do not understand 
that Thomas is consistent within categories of constitutional law but inconsistent 
across them. To mention one recent example, Ralph Rossum unsuccessfully attempts 
to distinguish his book about Thomas from my book about Thomas by claiming that 
all of Thomas’s constitutional decisions fit neatly under the umbrella of “original 
general meaning” originalism.88 That is untrue. As I explained at length in First 
Principles, Thomas approaches questions involving race differently than he does 
other types of constitutional law cases, and he does so because of the profound 
impact that race has had on his own life, including with respect to witnessing how 
his grandfather—the man after whom Thomas titled his memoir, My Grandfather’s 
Son89—was treated when Thomas was a child.90 Ralph Waldo Emerson famously 
remarked that “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little 
statesmen and philosophers and divines.”91 Clarence Thomas has taken Emerson’s 
adage to heart, which makes Thomas a wise man rather than a foolish one who needs 
his jurisprudence characterized by conservative scholars as a square peg to be 
pounded into a round hole. 
Mark Tushnet, by contrast—almost certainly the most prolific Left-wing 
constitutional law professor of the present day—understands the distinction in 
Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence between liberal originalism and conservative 
originalism. Tushnet stated in his book about the Rehnquist Court: 
The law professor Scott Gerber suggests that positions like this reflect a 
division within Thomas, between what Gerber calls liberal originalism, 
which tells judges to interpret the Constitution in light of the Declaration 
of Independence, and conservative or Borkean originalism, which tells 
them to regard the compromises embedded in the Constitution as 
                                                           
 86 See GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 6. 
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expressing the framers’ underlying principles . . . . There’s surely 
something to Gerber’s position.92 
The student editors of the Harvard Law Review likewise understood the 
difference between Justice Thomas’s liberal originalism in civil rights cases and his 
conservative originalism in other categories of constitutional law, although they were 
not as polite about it as Tushnet was. They wrote in a Book Note entitled Justice 
Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism assessing Thomas’s memoir:  
Professor Scott Gerber has aptly observed a dichotomy in Justice 
Thomas’s jurisprudence. He notes that Justice Thomas takes a “liberal 
originalist” approach to civil rights issues, particularly affirmative action, 
and a “conservative originalist” approach to civil liberties issues, such as 
abortion . . . . Justice Thomas’s failure to address the tensions in his 
judicial philosophy directly in My Grandfather’s Son leaves one to 
conclude that his divergent approaches to constitutional questions are 
built on the Justice’s personal policy preferences.93 
The Critical Race Theorist andré douglas pond cummings—his capitalization 
style, not mine—also understood the distinction in Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence 
between liberal originalism and conservative originalism.94 cummings was even 
more critical of it than the editors of the Harvard Law Review were. cummings was 
writing in response to Thomas’s “startling dissenting opinion” in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, in which Thomas maintained, as he later did in Fisher v. University of 
Texas, that the admissions program at the University of Michigan Law School was 
unconstitutional because it was not color-blind.95 cummings wrote: 
Thomas’s adoption of “liberal originalism” may appear innocuous at first 
blush. Indeed, his mantra that the Constitution be interpreted in a “color 
blind” fashion, and that the Constitution protects every individual’s rights 
equally, regardless of skin color, appears laudable, even impressive. 
                                                           
 92 MARK V. TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96 (2005). See also Mark Tushnet, Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (2005). 
 93 Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1434-
35 (reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR (2007)). Several 
other scholars likewise understand the difference between Justice Thomas’s liberal 
originalism and his conservative originalism. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Clarence Thomas’s 
Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 535, 536 (2009) (reviewing HENRY 
MARK HOLZER, THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS OF CLARENCE THOMAS, 1991-2006: A 
CONSERVATIVE'S PERSPECTIVE (2007)) (Thomas’s “jurisprudence is probably best described in 
Scott Douglas Gerber’s term, as ‘liberal originalism’: a version of originalism closer to the 
Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty articulated in the Declaration of Independence 
than the ‘conservative originalism’ associated with Robert Bork and others who deprecate 
Jeffersonian principles and cling to the ‘civic republicanism’ interpretation of the American 
Revolution.”). 
 94 See andré douglas pond cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Affirmative 
Action and the Treachery of Originalism: “The Sun Don’t Shine Here in This Part of Town,” 
21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 14 (2005). 
 95 Id. at 1. 
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However, watching Thomas apply these impressive ideals to real life 
cases shows clearly the havoc that such application wreaks on 
constitutional issues of race[.] . . . Thomas’s fixation on individual rights 
versus group concern has the group most impacted (and injured) by his 
decisions and votes screaming: What is to be done about 225 years of 
racism, oppression, and continued racial discord and discrimination? 
What efforts are being made to level the playing field, so that the 
protection of individual rights is truly meaningful? What attempts are 
being made to repair or devise reparations for state and government 
sponsored discrimination and racism? What efforts are being made toward 
repairing broken inner cities? How does a nation repair and ameliorate, 
without considering groups and the injustice visited upon an entire race?96 
 cummings’s passion is certainly admirable. Unfortunately, he completely 
overlooked a fundamental point: Clarence Thomas is a judge, not a legislator. It is 
Justice Thomas’s job to interpret the Constitution, not to rewrite it. Although it has 
not won me many friends in the law professorate,97 my research has convinced me 
that Thomas is correct to view the Constitution as requiring color-blindness in civil 
rights cases.98 As I described above, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and 
Martin Luther King Jr. would agree. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL ORIGINALISM 
It is a bit awkward to write an article about constitutional interpretation that 
frequently reads, at least to me, like Walt Whitman’s Song of Myself sans the lyrical 
genius.99 But the future of liberal originalism is too important to do anything except 
address the subject head on. In fact, in another symposium in which I had the 
pleasure of participating with Lee Strang—a retrospective on Clarence Thomas’s 
twenty years on the Supreme Court100—the subtitle to Strang’s article was “Justice 
Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism” and he concluded “that, of 
the two, Justice Scalia has, as a practical matter, done more to move American legal 
practice toward originalism than Justice Thomas.”101 (Justice Scalia is a conservative 
originalist.) Moreover, in a recent book entitled The Failed Promise of Originalism, 
Frank Cross is likewise skeptical about the “promise” of liberal originalism. I will 
conclude this article about liberal originalism with a few thoughts about Cross’s 
critique of it. 
                                                           
 96 Id. at 18-19 (citing First Principles). 
 97 See Gerber, Introductory Address, supra note 54, at 689-90. 
 98 See, e.g., GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at ch. 3. Thomas also believes that 
color-blindness is the best policy. Id. at ch. 2. 
 99 See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (1892), available at 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/174745 (last visited June 18, 2014). 
 100 See Symposium, Celebrating an Anniversary: A Twenty-Year Review of Justice 
Clarence Thomas’ Jurisprudence and Contributions as an Associate Justice on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 663, 666 (2011). 
 101 Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist? Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the 
Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 882 (2011) (citing both First 
Principles and To Secure These Rights). 
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Cross discusses liberal originalism in a chapter about the sources that originalists 
consult.102 After expressing concern about the unreliability of The Federalist, the 
ratification records, Founding-era dictionaries, and the records of the constitutional 
convention, he turns to the Declaration of Independence. He cites my work for the 
claim that some scholars insist that the Declaration is at the “heart of the 
Constitution,”103 and he concedes that the Declaration was a “corporate statement, 
not the opinions of one or a few individuals.”104 He nevertheless suggests that its 
meaning is too indeterminate to serve as a viable constraint on judicial decision-
making. Cross writes: 
When originalism was gaining credence as a theory, Raoul Berger argued 
that it was the antidote to living constitutionalists trying to fulfill their 
“libertarian hopes” (Berger 1977). Yet, to some leading modern-day 
originalists, the theory is central to the fulfillment of their own 
“libertarian hopes.” These modern-day libertarian originalists rely in part 
on the natural rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence, with 
the Ninth Amendment as central evidence of this philosophy. Thus, 
originalism has been conceived as both strongly antilibertarian and 
extremely prolibertarian, which might cause some to question its 
determinacy.105 
Cross also insists that the fact that leading contemporary originalists such as 
Steven Calabresi have “challenged the modern libertarian originalists” on textual and 
historical grounds “illustrates the great difficulty of any authentic descriptivist 
original understanding.”106 I disagree. With respect to the always insightful Professor 
Calabresi, as I pointed out in the above discussion of the work of Patrick Charles and 
Lee Strang, liberal originalism is grounded in political theory, rather than textualism 
or history. With respect to Cross’s larger point about judicial decisionmaking—his 
book is primarily an empirical study about how Supreme Court justices have 
employed originalism when deciding actual cases—simply because most Supreme 
Court justices seem to be result-oriented does not mean that the originalist materials 
they claim to be employing are indeterminate. Rather, it means we need better 
judges. Bluntly put, the President and the Senate need to appoint justices who are 
“thinkers, and more particularly, legal philosophers”107 who can exercise the self-
restraint necessary to interpret the Constitution in light of the political philosophy of 
the Declaration of Independence on which it is based. We also need to impeach 
judges who either cannot do so or refuse to do so. Although Thomas Jefferson may 
have been correct in arguing that in practice impeachment has “not even [been] a 
                                                           
 102 See CROSS, supra note 14, at ch. 3. 
 103 Id. at 61 (quoting To Secure These Rights). 
 104 Id. at 62. 
 105 Id. at 71. 
 106 Id. at 71-72. 
 107 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 
795 (1957). 
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scare-crow,”108 that does not mean it should remain so. The theory of the 
Constitution requires that Congress exercise the political courage necessary to 
perform its constitutional duty of impeaching those justices who seek to “rewrite” 
the Constitution rather than “interpret” it.109 
                                                           
 108 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905). 
 109 Unpublished Opinion of Hugo Black (1966), in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
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